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Confessions of a Complexity Skeptic
Raphael Scholl
Abstract Three objections to Max Urchs’s paper on complexity are discussed. First,
Urchs’s macroeconomic illustrations of the benefits of complexity thinking are open
to more conventional interpretations. Second, Urchs formulates a thesis concerning
the relationship between science and society which is untenable if taken as a histori-
cal claim and insufficiently developed if taken as a metaphor. Third, methodological
problems in history and philosophy of science plague Urchs’s discussion of neuro-
science.
1 Introduction
Max Urchs argues in his contribution to the present volume that scientists and
philosophers of science should be more mindful of complexity. In this he agrees
with a number of recent contributions by such authors as Melanie Mitchell (2009a)
and Sandra Mitchell (2009b). In her book Unsimple Truths, Sandra Mitchell argues
that progress in scientific understanding will increasingly require complexity think-
ing, and that philosophy of science will need to adjust its meta-reflections accord-
ingly. Mitchell thinks that a host of issues will have to be reconsidered: reduction
and emergence, lawfulness, scientific method, prediction, and policy analysis.
In his discussion of cases from economics and the neurosciences, Urchs touches
on many of the same issues. In the comments in hand, it is not my goal to engage
with the debate about complexity as a whole. Instead I will focus on objections in
three of Urchs’s main areas of discussion: economic markets, the changing legacy
of the scientific revolution, and neuroscience. I am particularly interested in the
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question of what we can learn from individual cases from the sciences – that is, on
the proper use of case studies in philosophy of science.
First, Urchs argues that complexity thinking is helpful in modern economics, and
he identifies John Maynard Keynes as an early exponent of this view. I will argue
that a close consideration of Keynes’s science should not leave us unambiguously
favorable to complexity thinking. Second, Urchs makes the historical claim that a
certain kind of relationship between science and society was established during the
scientific revolution, and that this will have to change to accommodate complexity
thinking. I will argue that the historical claim is difficult to maintain, and that the
changing relationship between science and society is, at the very least, still up for
debate. Third, Urchs discusses the neurosciences as an area where complexity think-
ing will potentially be helpful. I neither affirm nor reject the thesis, but I argue that
the neurosciences as a case study are not suitable for Urchs’s purposes on strictly
methodological grounds.
It will be useful for the rest of the discussion to have some idea of what is meant
by complexity (for a recent discussion, see references cited above and Ladyman
et al, 2012). There is no consensus answer, and Urchs’s own approach to delineat-
ing the phenomenon is rather impressionistic. For the present discussion, I will think
of complex systems as involving a) a large number of entities, b) a large number of
possible (although perhaps simple) interactions, and c) multiple relevant levels of
description. The system at the aggregate level will display some sort of organiza-
tion or adaptation, and it may moreover be subject to continuing evolution, such
that the entities or their interactions change over time. I take it that these features
roughly capture the systems that authors like Sandra Mitchell and Melanie Mitchell
are talking about, and such systems would allow the occurrence of many of the phe-
nomena that Urchs attributes to complex systems (among these are deterministic
chaos, non-linearity, surprise1 and unpredictability).
2 Keynes, Complexity, and the Ineffectiveness of Monetary
Policy During the Economic Crisis
2.1 Keynes on parts and wholes
Urchs argues that John Maynard Keynes must be understood as a precursor of com-
plexity thinking. He quotes from the preface of the French edition of The General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money of 1939:
“I argue that important mistakes have been made through extending to the system as a whole
conclusions which have been correctly arrived at in respect of a part of it taken in isolation.”
(Keynes, 1973a, p. xxxii)
1 Unlike Urchs, however, I would strongly caution against a definition of complexity in which
subjective psychological experiences such as surprise play a role.
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Urchs wants us to read this in the context of complexity – perhaps as an endorse-
ment of system-level emergence. But we must take a close look at what Keynes
had in mind here. I will argue that Keynes can be reinterpreted in terms that do not
unambiguously support complexity thinking.2
Keynes’s goal in the French preface is to delineate the main distinguishing fea-
tures of his approach to economic theory, and in particular the reasons why he speaks
of a “general theory”. Immediately before the quotation above, he writes:
“I have called my theory a general theory. I mean by this that I am chiefly concerned with
the behaviour of the economic system as a whole,—with aggregate incomes, aggregate prof-
its, aggregate output, aggregate employment, aggregate investment, aggregate saving rather
than with the incomes, profits, output, employment, investment and saving of particular
industries, firms or individuals.” (p. xxxii)
This aggregate-level description laid the foundation for the current division of eco-
nomics into micro- and macroeconomics. Keynes goes on to illustrate the approach
using an example. His theory says that for the economy as a whole, savings must
equal investment. Now, if taken as a statement about individual economic actors,
this is plainly false, since there is no reason why an individual actor’s investment
should bear any relationship to his or her savings:
“Quite legitimately we regard an individual’s income as independent of what he himself
consumes and invests. But this, I have to point out, should not have led us to overlook the
fact that the demand arising out of the consumption and investment of one individual is the
source of the incomes of other individuals, so that incomes in general are not independent,
quite the contrary, of the disposition of individuals to spend and invest; and since in turn
the readiness of individuals to spend and invest depends on their incomes, a relationship
is set up between aggregate savings and aggregate investment which can be very easily
shown, beyond any possibility of reasonable dispute, to be of exact and necessary equality.”
(p. xxxii–xxxiii)
Keynes regards this as a “banale conclusion” with interesting consequences. It fol-
lows, for example, that when faced with a large burden of debt, the rational course
of action for an individual company is not the same as for an entire national econ-
omy. An individual company deals with debt by increasing the ratio of income to
expenditures. However, if an entire national economy cuts its spending, then – be-
cause one person’s spending is another person’s income – everybody will be poorer
off. Keynes writes:
“[I]t becomes evident that an increased propensity to save will ceteris paribus contract
incomes and output; while an increased inducement to invest will expand them.” (p. xxxiii)
That increased savings can lead to a loss of wealth is sometimes referred to as “the
paradox of thrift”. It constitutes the minimal core of recent disputes about how to
deal with the economic crisis that started in 2008. Proponents of “stimulus” ar-
gue that cutting government spending would be counterproductive, since increased
government savings will, as Keynes said, “contract incomes and output” of private
2 Urchs also gives us quotations from Keynes’s Treatise on Probability (1973b), and I have no com-
ments to make about these. I agree that it would be worthwhile to read the Treatise on Probability
from the point of view of complexity.
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actors like firms and households. Proponents of “austerity” argue that nations with
too much debt must decrease spending to bring their budgets into balance, and that
increased government spending would be ineffective stimulus.3
Thus aware of the context of Keynes’s statement about the properties of parts
and wholes, should we read his remark in the context of the debates about complex-
ity? I don’t think so, for a much more pedestrian story suggests itself. It seems
that Keynes’s subdiscipline-founding breakthrough was to identify a successful
aggregate-level (as opposed to component-level) description of causal factors in a
national economy. His description in terms of aggregate incomes, outputs, profits,
and so on, was successful in the sense that robust causal relationships could be
identified among these aggregate causal factors, and in the sense that these causal
relationships could be used to explain interesting phenomena (such as the behavior
of economies in times of recession). The next section’s more thorough discussion of
the IS-LM model, which is generally taken as a formal model of Keynes’s General
Theory, will make this even clearer.
It is at least not immediately obvious how complexity enters the picture. The
number of components in Keynes’s picture is in fact a reduction relative to what one
would expect: It turns out there can be meaningful economic models that completely
disregard the fact that economies are in reality made up of hundreds of thousands
of individual actors. Apparently, if one identifies the appropriate causal factors at
the aggregate level, one can abstract away much of the “complexity” of an econ-
omy. Similarly, the number of interactions between components does not multiply
in Keynes’s description. There are two levels of description in play, but I assume
that this by itself does not qualify a model for the complexity label. Perhaps there
is some other sense of complexity which applies to Keynes’s science – but Urchs’s
paper is scant help, since his definition of complexity is elusive.
2.2 The ineffectiveness of monetary policy during the economic
crisis
Another example discussed by Urchs suggests, upon close consideration, the same
story: component-level complexity giving way to simpler aggregate-level models.
Urchs reminds us that during the economic crisis, a standard remedy for slowing
economic growth has proved ineffective: lowering interest rates in order to stimulate
economic output. Urchs quotes John Coates:
“Economists assume economic agents act rationally, and thus respond to price signals such
as interest rates, the price of money. In the event of a market crash, so the thinking goes,
3 Proponents of austerity would not, however, deny the savings/investment equality. Instead, they
might argue that government investment in the present would increase interest rates and so “crowd
out” private sector investment. Or they might argue that increased government spending would be
taken as a sign of higher government deficits in the future. This in turn would lead to an expectation
of higher future corporate taxes, which would again induce companies in the present to reduce
investment.
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central banks need only lower interest rates to stimulate the buying of risky assets, which
now offer relatively more attractive returns compared to the low interest rates on Treasury
bonds. But central banks have met with very limited success in arresting the downward
momentum of a collapsing market. One possible reason for this failure could be that the
chronically high levels of cortisol among the banking community have powerful cognitive
effects.” (page number not yet available)
Perhaps the supposed relationship between the monetary base, interest rates and
economic output is, as Urchs writes, “like a compass that will work properly only if
there is no wind” (page number not yet available)?
The invocation of cortisol levels is certainly in the spirit of Sandra Mitchell’s
arguments that most interesting phenomena will ultimately have to be understood at
a number of interacting levels. Her main example is clinical depression, where we
must expect a full understanding to include both molecular factors and the patient’s
social environment, among other things. Similarly, economists may have to learn
to model the behavior of bankers not just in terms of rational responses to interest
rates, but also in terms of cortisol-related psychological processes of individuals.
Urchs himself expresses some skepticism about hormone-based explanations in
economics. However, he is correct in noting that if macroeconomists must begin to
model the hormonal state of individual traders, then macroeconomic models will
increase in complexity in a number of possible senses: The number of interacting
parts will increase, as will the potential for interactions among the parts and the
required number of levels of description.
However, it is far from certain that irrationality-inducing cortisol levels are
needed to explain the ineffectiveness of monetary policy during the economic cri-
sis.4 Some macroeconomists would argue that the ineffectiveness of monetary pol-
icy during the crisis is explained by aggregate-level factors – the kind that customar-
ily enter into macroeconomic analyses. In particular, they would point to the IS-LM
model, which is taken as a formal representation of Keynes’s General Theory. I
ask the reader to bear with me as I briefly introduce the IS-LM model. On this ba-
sis, it will then be possible to argue that the IS-LM model offers an analysis of the
ineffectiveness of monetary policy during the economic crisis which is plausibly
non-complex.
For a full presentation of the IS-LM model, I refer the reader elsewhere.5 The ba-
sic and familiar idea is that economic output in an economy is determined both by
the market for goods and services and by the market for money. More specifically,
the model tells us how the interplay between the two markets determines interest
rates and economic output. In a typical presentation of the IS-LM model (see fig-
ure 1), interest rates are indicated on the vertical axis and GDP is indicated on the
horizontal axis. The IS curve (for “investment–saving”) represents the market for
4 This is not a rejection of neuroeconomics (for a discussion, see Mäki, 2010). My rather more
modest argument is that the neurosciences may not be needed in the particular case discussed by
Urchs.
5 See for instance chapters 10 and 11 in the textbook by N. Gregory Mankiw (2002), and for a
brief blog-sized overview see Paul Krugman (2011).
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goods and services and the LM curve (for “liquidity preference–money supply”)
represents the market for money.
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Fig. 1 The IS-LM model after Mankiw (2002) and Krugman (2011). See text for explanations.
Let us look at the IS curve first, where the interest rate is the independent variable
and GDP is the dependent variable. Changes in the market for goods and services
can increase or decrease economic output. Decreases in interest rates will make the
financing of investments less costly, and so lower interest rates increase economic
output (this is why the IS curve is downward sloping). Several factors can shift the
IS curve. Increased government purchases will increase overall expenditures, overall
income, and economic output. Similarly, a tax decrease will also expand expenditure
and income. Both sorts of changes would shift the IS curve to the right. Conversely,
a decrease in government spending or a tax increase would shift the IS curve to the
left.
Let us now turn to the LM curve, where GDP is the independent and interest rate
the dependent variable. A higher GDP will mean higher demand for money, since
more interactions requiring money take place, and so interest rates will be higher
if GDP is higher (this is why the LM curve is upward sloping). Again there are
factors that can shift the LM curve. Interest rate at any given GDP can be affected
by changes in the amount of money available, that is, by the monetary policy of
central banks. An increase in the monetary base will tend to reduce interest rates: it
will shift the LM curve to the right. The converse happens if the monetary base is
reduced.
It is important to understand that the IS and LM curves represent possible equi-
librium points in the market for goods and services and the market for money. Let’s
look at the market for goods and services first. If GDP were above the level com-
patible with a certain interest rate, this would mean that companies are producing
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more goods than are demanded by current investment. Hence, companies would ac-
cumulate inventory and in response decrease production, which would bring GDP
in line with interest rates. Conversely, if GDP were below the level compatible with
the interest rate, more goods would be demanded than produced, inventories would
decline, and companies would increase production. This would again bring actual
GDP in line with the interest rate. In the market for money, an equilibrium process
is also at work. If interest rates were above equilibrium levels, individuals would try
to convert more of their money into interest-bearing bank deposits or bonds, and this
excess supply of money would cause banks and bond issuers to lower the interest
rates they offer. Conversely, if the interest rate were below equilibrium, banks and
bond issuers would offer higher interest rates to attract scarce money. The economy
as a whole is at the point where both the market for goods and services and the
market for money are in equilibrium: that is, at the intersection of the IS and LM
curves.
Now how can the IS-LM model explain the ineffectiveness of monetary policy
during the crisis? This is where I take it that there is controversy within the science
of economics. One explanation on offer, defended forcefully by the Nobel Prize
winner Paul Krugman, is that the economy in the crisis was in a so-called “liquid-
ity trap”.6 The basic idea is that many individuals in the economic crisis suddenly
found themselves in a position where they had a debt burden to reduce. This caused
expenditures to go down drastically – it shifted the IS curve far to the left, reducing
interest rates and economic output. Central banks reacted to the slump in output by
increasing the money supply (shifting the LM curve to the right). In normal times,
this would reduce interest rates and stimulate investment spending. However, since
the shift in the IS curve had already brought interest rates close to zero, a shift in
the LM curve could not affect them further, and so monetary policy had to remain
ineffective. This situation is shown in figure 2.
The liquidity trap offers an explanation for the failure of monetary policy during
the great recession which impresses by its relative simplicity. It is not within my
competence to say whether this explanation actually is correct. But if it is correct,
then macroeconomic success was again achieved by modeling the correct aggregate
factors and the correct causal relationships between them. And as far as I can tell, the
IS-LM model is not complex in the sense discussed here. Both in terms of entities
and interactions, the model is relatively parsimonious.
We must ask, however, whether the explanation provided by the IS-LM model is
truly independent of an explanation which invokes, for instance, the cortisol level
of individuals. Aren’t neuroscientific factors simply what explains that the IS curve
shifted far to the left – or in other words, isn’t the IS-LM analysis a mere description
of a process which Urchs (quoting Coates) wants to explain causally by appeal to
cortisol levels?
In a trivial way, neuroscientific facts are certainly part of the complete causal
story. The shift of the IS curve is explained by a reduction in overall planned ex-
penditure in the economy, caused by many economic actors suddenly facing a debt
6 But see also Mankiw’s discussion of the liquidity trap in his pre-crisis textbook (Mankiw, 2002),
chapter 11.
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Fig. 2 The IS-LM model in a “liquidity trap” (after Krugman, 2011). See text for explanations.
burden. All of this must be realized at the individual and neuronal level – and not
all individuals will face the same sort of debt, or react to it psychologically and neu-
rally in the same way. So micro-level realizations of the aggregate-level fact of “a
large decrease in planned expenditure” certainly exist and are multiply realized. But
I presume that this would be largely uncontested.
The more pressing question is whether the cortisol-levels explanation is intended
as complementary or alternative to the customary macroeconomic analysis. Return-
ing to the first sentence of Urchs’s quote from Coates, we read:
“Economists assume economic agents act rationally, and thus respond to price signals such
as interest rates, the price of money.” (page number not yet available, my emphasis)
Since economic agents during the crisis seemed not to react to price signals, cortisol
levels are offered as an explanation of this irrationality. They are thus clearly in-
tended as an alternative explanation: The neuroscientific facts are taken to explain
something that on a customary analysis remains obscure. However, on the IS-LM
analysis economic agents were not behaving irrationally, and so there is nothing for
the cortisol-levels hypothesis to explain! With interest rates having approached the
zero lower bound, an increase in the monetary base could not have been expected
to alter interest rates further – even if all economic agents were behaving rationally.
Cortisol levels and other neuroscientific facts surely constitute part of the micro-
level realization of macroeconomic states, but they are mere intermediate causes:
the explanatory work is done by the aggregate-level theory.
Friends of complexity might accept the foregoing analysis but insist that the ex-
planation of the ineffectiveness of monetary policy during the crisis is precisely what
complexity is all about. Among Urchs’s features of complexity is:
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“The very mechanism which generates a system’s behaviour is changing, leading thereby
to the evolution of new forms of connections.” (page number not yet available)
One might tell the story thus: In normal times, the economic system’s behavior is
such that an increase in the monetary base increases economic output. In the crisis,
the mechanism generating this behavior changed, leading to unexpected new results.
But I think it would be unwise to use the term “complexity” in case where we are
simply dealing with misconceptions about the mechanisms operating in the system.
The relevant macroeconomic model was perhaps not widely understood, but it is not
particularly complex.
Urchs writes that standard models in the economic crisis were somewhat like
a compass that only works if there is no storm. It is true that the expected rela-
tionship between expansion of the monetary base and economic output broke down
during the crisis, but the actual compass – the IS-LM model – may have weathered
the storm successfully. The IS-LM model is certainly more complex than the basic
expectations about monetary policy and economic output, but it is still relatively
simple.
It is of course possible to criticize the IS-LM analysis from the point of view of
complexity. For example, W. Brian Arthur (1999) argues that equilibrium analyses
are generally in need of expansion. I am sympathetic to this. But the case for such
expansions must rest on phenomena that the equilibrium analysis cannot explain.
And if my account above is correct, then the ineffectiveness of monetary policy
during the crisis of 2008 is not such a phenomenon.
To summarize, I remain skeptical that either Keynes’s talk about the properties
of parts and wholes or the ineffectiveness of monetary policy during the crisis offer
particularly good examples of complexity. Macroeconomic success in both cases
is not obviously dependent on an understanding of what Sandra Mitchell or Max
Urchs would call complexity. To the contrary, it seems that the key was to find
an aggregate-level description of the economy which could successfully handle the
system’s component-level diversity. All of this leaves open the possibility, of course,
that other cases from economics do in fact necessitate complexity thinking.
3 The “Renaissance Pact”
Urchs claims that science and society entered, some four hundred years ago, into a
“Renaissance pact” or “promise”:
“We, the scientists, will work hard to uncover the most fundamental structures of the world.
We will describe them in mathematical language in a Golden Book of Nature. Everyman re-
ceives a precise and perspicuous picture of reality that lays the foundation for technological
progress. We will be rewarded for that.” (page number not yet available)
He claims that the pact is now in need of revision because of complexity.
It is not clear how this Renaissance pact should be interpreted. Urchs paints the
scientific revolution as a response to an earlier breakdown in the communication
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between science and society, largely because science was theoretical rather than
applied. From this he develops the notion of a new relationship between science and
society from the renaissance onward – the aforementioned pact or promise. Urchs
does not refer to the historical literature to back up these claims. To the best of my
knowledge, they are untenable.
One difficulty of the proposal is that it may not even be a testable historical thesis.
This is because it is hard to conceptualize. Pacts have signatories, and promises are
made by someone to someone. Yet who would that be? Even if we take all early
modern scientists to pursue roughly the goal stated above (to “uncover the most
fundamental structures of the world”), which individuals or groups from society
offered a reward in return? Was it because a reward was promised that science was
professionalized and eventually publicly funded, some two centuries later? As a
matter of historical scholarship, I do not know how this thesis can be made precise.
But I suspect that the idea must be taken metaphorically: Over the past four
centuries, science has increasingly served society in a certain way, and now this
may be changing. Leaving the problematic historical claims aside, Urchs may be
saying that the epistemological goals of science may need to be adjusted.
Urchs seems to be thinking along the lines of Sandra Mitchell’s chapter 5, which
discusses policy in a world of complexity. On one conception, the task of science
is to make definitive predictions (for instance, on whether anthropogenic green-
house emissions will or won’t cause radical climate change), and these predictions
then allow us to act according to our desired outcomes. However, from a science of
complexity we may not get definitive predictions, but only an analysis of different
possible outcome spaces. Parts of the outcome space may show such sensitive de-
pendence on initial conditions that no predictions are possible. Policy in turn may
not be able to choose one outcome as a goal: We may have to settle for policy which
is robust in the sense that it leads to acceptable outcomes in a variety of different
scenarios, and our policy may in any case have to adapt itself as more is learned
about the systems with which we are dealing.
I find these ideas by and large unobjectionable, and to the extend that Urchs
is thinking about the same sorts of things, I agree with him. But we would have
to think carefully about whether any of this leads to a change in the relationship
between science and society. I rather suspect, for instance, that Mitchell gives us
a somewhat caricatured view of the “predict and act” model on which science is
supposed to have acted in the past. And the strength of the thesis clearly depends
on describing current practice correctly: If the new principles urged by the friends
of complexity are already part of science, then the new approach to prediction and
policy may not differ much from business as usual.7
In summary, it is not entirely clear what Urchs’s aims are in formulating the thesis
of the “Renaissance promise”. As a historical thesis it fails, and as a metaphor its
precise content remains to be articulated.
7 Another worrisome note is offered by a reviewer of Mitchell’s book. Kristin Shrader-Frechette
(2012) points out that some of Mitchell’s phrases such as “flexible management”, “continued in-
vestigation” and “learn by doing” can be weaponized by Washington lobbyists to mean toothless
regulation, delayed action and science-blindness.
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4 On the Function of Case Studies in Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of science works best with a strong empirical component, and so the use
of case studies from historical or contemporary science is necessary and welcome.
But it is a challenge to choose the right cases for any given philosophical purpose. To
illustrate the point, suppose we are interested in heuristics for the generation of novel
scientific hypotheses, and part of our argument is to show that our philosophical
proposal operates in a case study from actual science. It would surely tell us little
to see that one or another method of theory generation applies to a trivial scientific
discovery: It will not come as a surprise to anybody that some simple heuristics can
illuminate successful but modest extrapolations from known and well confirmed
theories. In order for our cases to test the value of the proposed heuristics, they
must be scientific theories of acknowledged novelty and originality. In this case,
hypotheses that led to a Nobel Prize are perhaps promising candidates. In general,
we may say that we must challenge our philosophy with hard cases.
The problem of the choice of case studies is particularly acute in the complexity
debate. One use for case studies is to show that we can solve certain problems only
by being mindful of one feature of complexity or another – for example, by studying
the interactions of a great many components, or by integrating causality at multiple
levels of organization or in multiple domains of investigation. But of course this
argument can only be made once at least some such problems are actually solved.
Only when some results are in can we analyze them and show how complexity
thinking was epistemologically fruitful.
Urchs’s section on neuroscience, however, is a mere promissory note: Neuro-
science may solve some or even many of its outstanding questions through methods
that are more mindful of complexity. This is plausible, since the number of interact-
ing entities as well as their multi-level organization is known to be large. But little is
accomplished by pointing to a subject which is at present insufficiently understood.
Our insufficient understanding may stem from the fact that we have not been mind-
ful of complexity – but we may also lack the right kind of mathematical methods,
or perhaps the correct aggregate-level causal factors have not yet been identified (as
was essential for Keynes’s work). Without additional arguments for the use of com-
plexity thinking, we do not learn much from neuroscience’s outstanding questions
beyond the fact that these questions exist.
A partial model for how to navigate this territory is Sandra Mitchell’s Unsim-
ple Truths (2009b). Discussing older concepts of emergence in her second chap-
ter, Mitchell notes that philosophers in the 19th century spoke of emergence in the
context of chemical properties (the fluidity of water, for instance) and biological
properties (inheritance) which later received reductive explanations. Mitchell then
argues for what she hopes will be a more useful new concept of emergence. By
opening her discussion with such philosophical precursors, Mitchell to some extent
diffuses the fears of readers like me: She knows that the number of phenomena that
seem intractable by customary methods has decreased for centuries, and that simply
pointing to an as yet ill-understood area of science is no argument for the necessity
of new methods. What is required in addition is an argument for why the remaining
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unsolved questions are different. Similarly, Mitchell discusses the case of major de-
pressive disorder in some detail to show how complexity thinking has been required
for understanding it. One can argue about whether Mitchell is entirely successful in
her project. In particular, I wished for a much more detailed treatment of the case
study. But at least her plan of attack is exactly right.
In summary, while the use of case studies in philosophy of science is necessary
and welcome, it is also difficult. Cases must be chosen such that a true test of a
philosophical thesis is possible. I argued that this does not succeed in Urchs’s section
on neuroscience (the case) and complexity (the philosophical thesis).
5 Conclusions
Having titled my comments “confessions of a complexity skeptic”, I conclude by
stressing – call it a hedge, if you must – that I have considerable sympathy for the
project of the friends of complexity. I wish the debate a long and healthy life. It is
difficult to approach philosophy of science from the perspective of the biomedical
sciences without suspecting that the notion of complexity may be both analytically
tractable and useful. Complex systems may lead us to a more robust concept of
emergence, or to a better understanding of causal inference in biological and social
systems. So my position should probably be described as local skepticism: I have
made explicit concrete problems faced by Urchs’s discussion of complexity, and
this leaves the door wide open for others to make the case for complexity more
compelling. However, the objections raised in my discussion have some claim to
generality. In order to argue for or against complexity, we will need to consider
cases from actual science very closely, and to think hard about what they can and
cannot tell us.
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